Experimental Philosophy Meets Formal Epistemology by Schupbach, Jonah N.
(Word	  count:	  4,998)	  Experimental	  Philosophy	  Meets	  Formal	  Epistemology1	  Jonah	  N.	  Schupbach,	  Philosophy,	  University	  of	  Utah	  	  
Abstract.	  	  Formal	  epistemology	  is	  just	  what	  it	  sounds	  like:	  epistemology	  done	  with	  formal	  tools.	  	  Coinciding	  with	  the	  general	  rise	  in	  popularity	  of	  experimental	  philosophy,	  formal	  epistemologists	  have	  begun	  to	  apply	  experimental	  methods	  in	  their	  own	  work.	  	  In	  this	  entry,	  I	  survey	  some	  of	  the	  work	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  formal	  and	  experimental	  epistemology.	  	  I	  show	  that	  experimental	  methods	  have	  unique	  roles	  to	  play	  when	  epistemology	  is	  done	  formally,	  and	  I	  highlight	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  results	  from	  formal	  epistemology	  have	  been	  used	  fruitfully	  to	  advance	  epistemically-­‐relevant	  experimental	  work.	  	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  brief,	  incomplete	  survey	  is	  that	  formal	  and	  experimental	  methods	  often	  constitute	  mutually	  informative	  means	  to	  epistemological	  ends.	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Formal	  epistemology	  is	  a	  flourishing	  subfield	  of	  philosophy	  that	  investigates	  classic	  epistemic	  topics	  –	  such	  as	  knowledge,	  belief,	  rationality,	  and	  justification	  –	  using	  logicomathematical	  methods.	  	  Formal	  epistemology	  is	  far	  from	  a	  new	  movement,	  tracing	  its	  roots	  back	  at	  least	  to	  Aristotle’s	  formal	  theory	  of	  the	  syllogism	  and	  his	  application	  of	  this	  theory	  in	  the	  characterization	  of	  epistêmê.	  	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
rationality	  to	  epistemology,	  and	  noting	  that	  formal	  logic	  traditionally	  developed	  as	  the	  science	  of	  rational	  inference,	  one	  may	  plausibly	  claim	  that	  the	  history	  of	  formal	  logic	  itself	  is	  a	  narrative	  belonging	  to	  the	  history	  of	  formal	  epistemology.	  To	  note	  that	  formal	  epistemology	  has	  a	  venerable	  pedigree,	  however,	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  its	  most	  important	  contributions	  are	  ancient	  history.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  there	  has	  arguably	  never	  been	  a	  more	  exciting,	  productive	  time	  to	  be	  a	  formal	  epistemologist.	  	  In	  part,	  this	  is	  because	  of	  the	  impressive	  development	  of	  formal	  methods.	  	  As	  such	  methods	  evolve	  (and	  as	  we	  appreciate	  more	  and	  more	  useful	  ways	  to	  apply	  them),	  formal	  epistemologists	  not	  only	  gain	  tools	  that	  could	  potentially	  lend	  new	  insight	  to	  ongoing	  projects,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  able	  to	  approach	  problems	  using	  formal	  methods	  that	  were	  previously	  formally	  intractable.	  This	  entry	  focuses	  on	  another	  reason	  to	  be	  excited	  about	  formal	  epistemology	  today:	  	  the	  budding	  interest	  in	  connecting	  it	  to	  experimental	  research.	  	  Often,	  it	  is	  only	  once	  a	  theory	  is	  stated	  precisely	  that	  its	  empirical	  implications	  (possibly	  along	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  even	  has	  empirical	  implications)	  become	  clear.	  	  At	  the	  intersection	  of	  formal	  and	  experimental	  epistemology,	  philosophers	  use	  logicomathematical	  tools	  to	  introduce	  precise	  philosophical	  theory,	  which	  then	  enables	  them	  to	  apply	  and	  test	  that	  theory	  experimentally.	  	  How	  this	  goes	  in	  detail	  depends	  on	  one’s	  philosophical	  ends.	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Much	  of	  the	  work	  pursued	  by	  formal	  epistemologists	  either	  aims	  at	  concept	  
engineering	  or	  concept	  clarification.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  one	  explicates	  concepts,	  where	  explication	  involves	  “transforming	  a	  given	  more	  or	  less	  inexact	  concept	  [the	  explicandum]	  into	  an	  exact	  one	  [the	  explicatum]”	  (Carnap	  1950,	  3).	  	  In	  concept	  engineering,	  this	  is	  done	  so	  that	  we	  might	  improve	  our	  conceptual	  frameworks;	  we	  replace	  explicanda	  with	  explicata	  that	  better	  assist	  us	  in	  achieving	  epistemic	  ends.	  	  Alternatively,	  in	  concept	  clarification,	  philosophers	  explicate	  concepts	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  implications	  of	  those	  explicanda;	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  illuminate	  rather	  than	  replace	  explicanda.	  This	  distinction	  is	  especially	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  one	  is	  deciding	  whether	  an	  explication	  is	  satisfactory.	  	  Carnap	  (1950)	  helpfully	  proposes	  four	  desiderata	  for	  explication	  evaluation;	  for	  our	  purposes,	  we	  may	  focus	  on	  two.	  	  First,	  an	  explicatum	  should	  retain	  a	  similarity	  to	  the	  explicandum	  so	  that	  it	  applies	  in	  most	  (if	  not	  all)	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  applies.	  	  Second,	  the	  explicatum	  should,	  in	  some	  sense,	  be	  epistemically	  fruitful,	  e.g.,	  by	  allowing	  us	  to	  learn	  things	  more	  efficiently.2	  	  But	  these	  two	  desiderata	  can	  conflict;	  greater	  similarity	  may	  only	  be	  attainable	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  fruitfulness	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  When	  this	  happens,	  the	  concept	  engineer	  prizes	  fruitfulness	  above	  similarity	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  improved	  conceptual	  schema.	  	  The	  concept	  clarifier	  instead	  prizes	  similarity,	  as	  any	  explication	  only	  has	  a	  chance	  of	  illuminating	  the	  explicandum	  insofar	  as	  its	  explicatum	  (fruitful	  or	  not)	  maintains	  the	  requisite	  resemblance.	  Experiments	  connect	  to	  formal	  epistemology	  in	  different	  ways,	  depending	  on	  whether	  one	  is	  pursuing	  concept	  clarification	  or	  engineering.	  	  The	  concept	  clarifier	  may	  experimentally	  test	  the	  similarity	  of	  explicata	  to	  explicanda;	  such	  experiments	  potentially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Carnap	  more	  stringently	  requires	  the	  explicatum	  to	  be	  fruitful	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  “useful	  for	  the	  formulation	  of	  many	  universal	  statements	  (empirical	  laws	  [or]	  logical	  theorems	  […]).”	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inform	  –	  by	  enabling	  us	  to	  evaluate	  –	  work	  in	  formal	  epistemology.	  	  The	  concept	  engineer	  may	  experimentally	  explore	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  an	  explicatum;	  and,	  if	  an	  explicatum	  proves	  fruitful,	  formal	  epistemological	  results	  can	  inform	  experimental	  research.3	  This	  entry	  surveys	  such	  formal-­‐experimental	  research.	  	  Section	  2	  discusses	  work	  in	  which	  experiments	  test	  whether	  formal	  epistemological	  theory	  maintains	  a	  substantive	  similarity	  to	  cognitive	  factors.	  	  Section	  3	  explores	  work	  in	  which	  formal	  epistemological	  results	  fruitfully	  advance	  experimental	  research.	  	  Specific	  topics	  covered	  relate	  to	  an	  array	  of	  epistemological	  sub-­‐disciplines	  –	  including	  mainstream	  epistemology,	  the	  epistemology	  of	  science,	  social	  epistemology,	  the	  general	  study	  of	  human	  reasoning,	  and	  of	  course	  formal	  epistemology.	  	  1. Experiments	  Informing	  Formal	  Epistemology	  Formal	  epistemologists	  often	  use	  explication	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  epistemic	  concepts.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  such	  work	  that	  explicata	  maintain	  a	  similarity	  to	  explicanda.	  	  This	  section	  offers	  examples	  of	  experimental	  tests	  for	  similarity.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  three	  topics:	  confirmation,	  explanatory	  reasoning,	  and	  coherence.	  In	  Bayesian	  confirmation	  theory,	  formal	  epistemologists	  offer	  the	  following	  explication:	  	  evidence	  E	  confirms	  hypothesis	  H	  (relative	  to	  a	  set	  of	  background	  beliefs	  K)	  exactly	  when	  E	  raises	  H’s	  probability	  (conditional	  on	  K):	  	  Pr(H|E&K)>Pr(H|K).4	  	  While	  Bayesians	  agree	  on	  that	  much,	  they	  disagree	  on	  the	  best	  explication	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  E	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  (Schupbach,	  Unpublished)	  provides	  an	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  explication,	  concept	  engineering,	  concept	  clarification,	  and	  the	  bearing	  of	  experimental	  work	  on	  these.	  4	  Pr	  is	  a	  probability	  function	  defined	  over	  a	  field	  of	  propositions	  containing	  H,	  E,	  and	  K	  (where	  K	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  conjunction	  of	  propositions	  collectively	  describing	  relevant	  background	  beliefs).	  	  The	  solidus	  “|”	  may	  be	  read	  as	  “conditional	  on”	  or	  “given	  that”;	  accordingly,	  one	  may	  read	  the	  above	  inequality	  as	  “the	  probability	  of	  H	  conditional	  on	  E	  and	  K	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  probability	  of	  H	  conditional	  on	  K	  alone.”	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confirms	  H.	  	  The	  question	  is	  how	  to	  measure	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  above	  inequality.	  	  Obvious	  candidates	  include	  a	  difference	  measure	  Cd(H,E|K)=Pr(H|E&K)–Pr(H|K)	  and	  ratio	  measure	  Cr(H,E|K)=Pr(H|E&K)/Pr(H|K),	  but	  many	  others	  have	  been	  defended	  (Table	  1).	  	  Importantly,	  which	  of	  these	  explicata	  one	  adopts	  can	  make	  a	  crucial	  difference	  to	  philosophical	  conclusions	  about	  confirmation	  we	  draw	  from	  them;	  e.g.,	  Fitelson	  (1999)	  shows	  that	  various	  Bayesian	  “resolutions”	  of	  well-­‐known	  paradoxes	  hinge	  sensitively	  on	  one’s	  choice	  of	  measure.	  
Table	  1.	  	  Some	  alternative	  Bayesian	  explicata	  for	  degree	  of	  confirmation	  Cd(H,E|K)=Pr(H|E&K)–Pr(H|K)	   Cs(H,E|K)=Pr(H|E&K)–Pr(H|~E&K)	  Cm(H,E|K)=Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|K)	   Cn(H,E|K)=Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|~H&K)	  Cc(H,E|K)=Pr(H&E|K)–Pr(H|K)Pr(E|K)	   Cr(H,E|K)=Pr(H|E&K)/Pr(H|K)	  CG(H,E|K)=1–[Pr(~H|E&K)/Pr(~H|K)]	   CZ(H,E|K)= Pr(H|E&K)–Pr(H|K)1–Pr(H|K) ,	  if	  Pr(H|E&K)≥Pr(H|K)Pr(H|E&K)–Pr(H|K)Pr(H|K) ,	  if	  Pr(H|E&K)<Pr(H|K)	  Ck(H,E|K)= Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|~H&K)Pr(E|H&K)+Pr(E|~H&K)	  	   Considerations	  of	  similarity	  are	  crucial	  here.	  	  Can	  we	  verify	  that	  any	  one	  of	  these	  measures	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  confirmation	  applied	  in	  human	  cognition?	  	  Our	  explication	  will	  only	  illuminate	  this	  concept	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  can.5	  	  Crupi,	  Tentori,	  and	  collaborators	  (Tentori	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Crupi,	  Tentori,	  and	  Gonzalez	  2007)	  	  use	  experiments	  to	  investigate	  this	  question.	  	  In	  personal	  interviews,	  participants	  were	  informed	  that	  they	  had	  before	  them	  one	  of	  two	  urns,	  urn	  A	  containing	  30	  black	  and	  10	  white	  balls,	  urn	  B	  containing	  15	  black	  and	  25	  white	  balls.	  	  The	  experimenter	  then	  began	  sampling	  balls	  from	  the	  urn.	  	  After	  each	  of	  ten	  draws	  without	  replacement,	  participants	  assessed	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  issue	  as	  some	  philosophers	  (e.g.,	  Strawson	  1963)	  have	  challenged	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  using	  formal	  explication	  for	  concept	  clarification	  by	  arguing	  that	  formal	  explicata	  cannot	  maintain	  a	  close	  fit	  to	  informal	  explicanda.	  	  See	  (Schupbach,	  Unpublished)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  challenge	  and	  experimentation’s	  role	  in	  potentially	  meeting	  it.	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samples	  confirm	  the	  respective	  hypotheses	  that	  urn	  A/B	  was	  the	  chosen	  urn.	  	  These	  data	  allowed	  Crupi	  and	  Tentori	  to	  compare	  theoretical	  degrees	  of	  confirmation	  derived	  from	  candidate	  measures	  to	  human	  assessments	  of	  confirmation.	  The	  results	  were	  as	  follows:	  	  CZ	  outperformed	  all	  other	  candidates	  in	  a	  paired	  t-­‐test	  comparing	  the	  average	  (Pearson)	  correlations	  between	  derived	  results	  and	  participant	  responses;	  i.e.,	  CZ	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  significantly	  better	  (linear)	  predictor	  of	  confirmation	  judgments	  under	  the	  experimental	  conditions.	  	  This	  supports	  the	  comparative	  conclusion	  that	  CZ	  comes	  closer	  to	  our	  notion	  of	  confirmation	  than	  the	  other	  considered	  Bayesian	  measures.6	  	  There	  remains	  the	  question,	  however,	  of	  how	  closely	  CZ	  –	  or	  any	  other	  measure	  –	  fits	  overall	  with	  this	  notion.	  	  Tentori,	  Crupi,	  and	  Osherson	  (2007)	  present	  a	  separate	  study	  that	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  this	  question.	  	  In	  two	  experiments,	  they	  compare	  purely	  probabilistic	  approaches	  to	  confirmation	  in	  general	  with	  human	  judgments	  of	  confirmation.	  	  Their	  results	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  such	  judgments	  “depend	  on	  more	  than	  probabilities	  over	  E	  and	  H.”	  	  The	  implication	  for	  Bayesian	  confirmation	  theory	  is	  that,	  while	  certain	  measures	  may	  maintain	  a	  close	  resemblance	  to	  our	  notion	  of	  confirmation,	  any	  such	  explicatum	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  perfect	  fit.	  	  But	  what	  would	  constitute	  a	  sufficiently	  good	  fit,	  and	  can	  any	  probabilistic	  account	  provide	  that?	  	  These	  lingering	  questions	  call	  out	  for	  further	  (philosophical	  and	  empirical)	  investigation.	  Formal	  epistemological	  research	  on	  explanatory	  reasoning	  focuses	  on	  explicating	  a	  variety	  of	  attributes	  people	  look	  for	  in	  good	  explanations.	  	  Several	  of	  these	  “explanatory	  virtues”	  relate	  an	  explanatory	  hypothesis	  to	  what	  is	  being	  explained	  (e.g.,	  unification,	  power,	  and	  consilience),	  while	  others	  are	  properties	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  alone	  (e.g.,	  “internal”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Rusconi	  et	  al.	  (Forthcoming)	  present	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  which	  lend	  further	  comparative	  support	  to	  CZ	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  (Bayesian	  and	  non-­‐Bayesian)	  explications	  of	  “the	  value	  of	  evidence.”	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versions	  of	  plausibility,	  coherence,	  and	  simplicity).	  	  In	  any	  case,	  formal	  epistemologists	  attempt	  to	  illuminate,	  by	  explicating,	  these	  virtues.	  The	  study	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  power	  parallels	  Bayesian	  work	  on	  confirmation.	  	  A	  hypothesis	  H	  has	  power	  over	  an	  explanandum	  E	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  makes	  E	  less	  surprising	  (or	  more	  expected).	  	  Probabilistically,	  power	  is	  the	  flipside	  of	  confirmation;	  confirmation	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  H	  is	  more	  probable	  in	  light	  of	  E,	  whereas	  power	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  E	  is	  more	  probable	  given	  H.	  	  Accordingly,	  as	  with	  confirmation,	  various	  Bayesian	  measures	  of	  power	  have	  been	  proposed	  (Table	  2).	  
Table	  2.	  	  Some	  alternative	  Bayesian	  explicata	  for	  power	  Ed(E,H|K)=Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|K)	   EC(E,H|K)=Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|~H&K)	  
EP(E,H|K)= Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|K)Pr(E|H&K)+Pr(E|K)	  	  ES(E,H|K)= Pr(H|E&K)–Pr(H|~E&K)Pr(H|E&K)+Pr(H|~E&K)	  
EM(E,H|K)=Pr(E|H&K)/Pr(E|K)	  
EZ(E,H|K)= Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|K)1–Pr(E|K) ,	  if	  Pr(E|H&K)≥Pr(E|K)Pr(E|H&K)–Pr(E|K)Pr(E|K) ,	  if	  Pr(E|H&K)<Pr(E|K)	  	  To	  evaluate	  how	  similar	  these	  alternatives	  are	  to	  our	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  power,	  Schupbach	  (2011)	  asks	  participants	  for	  assessments	  of	  explanatoriness	  in	  experimental	  settings	  based	  closely	  on	  Tentori	  et	  al.’s	  ball-­‐and-­‐urn	  design	  (e.g.,	  how	  well	  does	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  urn	  A	  was	  chosen	  explain	  the	  results	  sampled	  so	  far?).	  	  Two	  analyses	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  ES	  “comes	  significantly	  closer	  to	  participant	  judgments	  than	  any	  other	  candidate	  measure.”	  	  Regarding	  the	  question	  of	  overall	  fit,	  the	  study	  reveals	  that	  ES’s	  results	  not	  only	  sit	  quite	  closely,	  on	  average,	  to	  participant	  judgments,	  but	  their	  mean	  is	  also	  centered	  on	  that	  of	  participant	  judgments	  (other	  measures’	  results	  are	  biased,	  on	  average,	  to	  one	  side	  of	  these	  judgments).	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While	  the	  virtue	  of	  power	  relates	  hypotheses	  to	  explananda,	  simplicity	  is	  predicated	  monadically	  to	  hypotheses	  alone.	  	  Experiments	  by	  Lombrozo	  (2007)	  focus	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  simplicity	  formalized	  as	  number	  of	  causes	  cited	  by	  a	  hypothesis.	  	  Her	  research	  broaches	  two	  questions:	  	  First,	  is	  this	  formal	  idea	  recognized	  as	  an	  explanatory	  virtue	  in	  actual	  human	  reasoning	  (the	  similarity	  question)?	  	  Second,	  how	  do	  people’s	  judgments	  of	  simplicity	  relate	  to	  their	  judgments	  of	  probability?	  Participants	  are	  asked	  to	  diagnose	  an	  alien	  patient’s	  two	  symptoms	  by	  appealing	  either	  to	  a	  single	  disease	  X	  or	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  two	  other	  diseases,	  Y&Z.	  	  Participants	  are	  told	  that	  X	  “always	  causes	  both”	  symptoms,	  while	  Y	  and	  Z	  jointly	  (but	  not	  individually)	  account	  fully	  for	  both	  symptoms.	  	  With	  this	  information,	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  participants	  opt	  for	  X	  over	  Y&Z	  as	  the	  best	  diagnosis,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  number	  of	  causes	  cited	  does	  indeed	  track	  a	  perceived	  explanatory	  virtue.	  Variations	  on	  this	  experiment	  explore	  the	  relation	  between	  explanatory	  and	  probability	  judgments.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  given	  the	  above	  information	  along	  with	  base	  rates	  revealing	  that	  Y&Z	  are	  together	  more	  prevalent	  in	  the	  alien	  population	  than	  X,	  participants	  still	  often	  favor	  the	  simpler	  diagnosis.	  	  Lombrozo	  notes	  that	  these	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  grant	  simple	  hypotheses	  higher	  prior	  probabilities,	  which	  they	  subsequently	  update	  appropriately	  in	  light	  of	  base	  rate	  information.	  	  Bonawitz	  and	  Lombrozo	  (2012)	  replicate	  these	  same	  findings	  with	  pre-­‐school	  aged	  children.7	  Experiments	  like	  the	  above	  prove	  useful	  in	  testing	  formal	  accounts	  of	  explanatory	  virtues.	  	  And	  by	  revealing	  contexts	  in	  which	  explanatory	  reasoning	  tracks	  formal	  explicata,	  this	  work	  potentially	  justifies	  the	  drawing	  of	  normative	  conclusions	  about	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  another	  recent	  study	  in	  this	  vein,	  see	  Pacer	  et	  al.’s	  (2013)	  investigation	  into	  whether	  four	  computational	  models	  of	  overall	  explanatoriness	  “correspond	  to	  general	  human	  intuitions.”	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reasoning	  from	  analyses	  of	  formal	  correlates.	  	  Bayesian	  explications	  of	  power	  (Table	  2),	  for	  example,	  imply	  that	  the	  more	  power	  a	  hypothesis	  has	  over	  a	  given	  explanandum,	  the	  better	  confirmed	  it	  is	  by	  that	  explanandum	  (using	  any	  Bayesian	  measure	  of	  confirmation).	  	  Insofar	  as	  experiments	  reveal	  contexts	  in	  which	  explanatory	  reasoning	  fits	  closely	  with	  one	  of	  these	  explicata	  then,	  we	  gain	  a	  neat	  account	  of	  why	  explanatory	  reasoning	  may	  be	  good	  in	  those	  contexts:	  	  because	  it	  reliably	  tracks	  probabilistic	  confirmation	  relations.8	  Epistemologists	  speak	  of	  coherence	  vaguely	  as	  the	  property	  things	  have	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  fit	  together,	  dovetail,	  or	  agree.	  	  Coherence	  can	  plausibly	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  another	  explanatory	  virtue;	  the	  more	  coherent	  an	  explanation,	  the	  better.	  	  But	  people	  also	  assess	  beliefs,	  norms,	  choices,	  and	  values	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  coherent;	  so	  coherence	  may	  for	  example	  underlie	  practical	  reasoning	  (Millgram	  and	  Thagard	  1996).	  	  Bayesians	  attempt	  probabilistic	  explications	  of	  coherence,	  and	  recent	  experimental	  work	  investigates	  whether	  these	  accounts	  connect	  to	  human	  cognition	  (Harris	  and	  Hahn	  2009).	  	  However,	  there	  has	  been	  far	  more	  experimental	  work	  testing	  Thagard’s	  computational	  account	  of	  coherence.	  This	  explication	  associates	  coherence-­‐based	  reasoning	  with	  constraint	  satisfaction	  (Thagard	  2000).	  	  In	  any	  “coherence	  problem,”	  we	  hunt	  for	  an	  “accepted”	  subset	  of	  a	  set	  of	  elements	  E={e1,	  e2,…,	  en}	  which	  best	  satisfies	  a	  given	  set	  of	  constraints.	  	  These	  constraints	  may	  link	  elements	  in	  a	  positive	  way	  (e.g.,	  if	  ej	  implies	  ek,	  a	  positive	  constraint	  may	  require	  that	  we	  accept	  both),	  or	  in	  a	  negative	  way	  (e.g.,	  if	  ej	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  ek,	  a	  negative	  constraint	  may	  require	  that	  we	  accept	  only	  one).	  	  Each	  particular	  constraint	  is	  assigned	  a	  weight.	  	  Thagard	  explicates	  coherence	  as	  W,	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  weights	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  reader	  may	  wish	  to	  consult	  (Lombrozo,	  this	  volume)	  for	  more	  information	  regarding	  formal-­‐experimental	  work	  on	  explanation.	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constraints	  that	  get	  satisfied	  by	  a	  particular	  partition	  of	  E;	  thus,	  maximizing	  coherence	  amounts	  to	  partitioning	  E	  into	  two	  sets	  (accepted	  and	  rejected)	  in	  a	  way	  that	  maximizes	  W.	  By	  specifying	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  elements	  and	  constraints	  in	  question,	  one	  may	  distinguish	  varieties	  of	  coherence.	  	  Explanatory	  coherence,	  which	  has	  received	  the	  most	  experimental	  attention,	  is	  that	  type	  of	  coherence	  in	  which	  elements	  are	  propositions	  and	  constraints	  implement	  various	  explanatory	  conditions	  –	  e.g.,	  “A	  hypothesis	  coheres	  with	  what	  it	  explains”	  and	  “the	  more	  hypotheses	  it	  takes	  to	  explain	  something,	  the	  lower	  the	  degree	  of	  coherence.”	  	  Thagard	  (1989)	  develops	  a	  program,	  “ECHO”,	  that	  computes	  approximate	  solutions	  to	  explanatory	  coherence	  problems	  using	  a	  connectionist	  (neural	  network)	  algorithm.	  Through	  a	  series	  of	  experiments,	  Schank	  and	  Ranney	  (1991)	  investigate	  “the	  relationship	  between	  human	  explanatory	  reasoning	  and	  explanatory	  evaluation	  as	  implemented	  in	  ECHO.”	  	  For	  example,	  in	  one	  of	  their	  experiments,	  participants	  evaluated	  the	  “believability”	  of	  two	  hypotheses,	  H1	  and	  H2,	  in	  two	  scenarios	  differing	  only	  in	  how	  many	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  one	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  (H2)	  explained.	  	  ECHO	  predicts	  that	  which	  hypothesis	  is	  part	  of	  the	  most	  explanatorily	  coherent	  solution	  depends	  on	  which	  scenario	  one	  is	  in.	  	  The	  question,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  testing	  the	  similarity	  of	  this	  explication	  of	  coherence,	  is	  whether	  participants’	  judgments	  agree	  with	  ECHO’s	  predictions.	  Results	  were	  favorable	  to	  Thagard’s	  explication.	  	  An	  ANOVA	  test	  revealed	  that	  participants’	  assessments	  of	  H1	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  across	  the	  two	  scenarios,	  but	  those	  pertaining	  to	  H2	  did.	  	  Believability-­‐ratings	  of	  H2	  were	  significantly	  higher	  than	  those	  of	  H1	  only	  in	  the	  second	  scenario.	  	  All	  of	  this	  was	  as	  predicted	  by	  ECHO.	  	  Other	  experimental	  tests	  were	  similarly	  favorable	  to	  this	  explicatum,	  leading	  Schank	  and	  Ranney	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to	  conclude,	  “ECHO’s	  ability	  to	  model	  the	  subjects’	  propositional	  evaluations	  well	  […]	  suggests	  that	  ECHO	  shows	  continued	  promise	  for	  predicting	  human	  explanatory	  reasoning.”	  	  Schank	  and	  Ranney’s	  experiments	  test	  ECHO	  in	  cases	  where	  only	  the	  breadth	  of	  explanations	  is	  varied;	  Read	  and	  Marcus-­‐Newhall	  (1993)	  extend	  this	  work,	  confirming	  the	  predictive	  accuracy	  of	  ECHO	  under	  other	  sorts	  of	  variations	  (e.g.,	  simplicity).	  Interestingly,	  the	  majority	  of	  experiments	  on	  the	  constraint-­‐satisfaction	  notion	  of	  coherence	  have	  not	  focused	  on	  testing	  for	  similarity.	  	  Rather,	  these	  use	  ECHO	  to	  advance	  experimental	  psychological	  research	  on	  various	  topics	  –	  e.g.,	  how	  people	  construct	  mental	  models	  of	  others	  (Read	  and	  Miller	  1993),	  or	  how	  humans	  transform	  complex,	  ambiguous	  information	  into	  coherent	  decisions	  (Simon	  and	  Holyoak	  2002).	  	  Here,	  instead	  of	  being	  tested	  by	  experimental	  work,	  formal	  epistemology	  is	  informing	  experimental	  work.	  	  This	  way	  of	  combining	  formal	  epistemology	  and	  experimentation	  is	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  section.	  	  2. Formal	  Epistemology	  Informing	  Experiments	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  take	  a	  brief	  look	  at	  recent	  work	  in	  which	  the	  products	  of	  formal	  epistemology	  advance	  experimental	  research.	  	  Here,	  formal	  epistemology	  informs	  experimental	  work;	  however,	  the	  direction	  of	  information	  runs	  in	  the	  other	  direction	  too,	  as	  such	  work	  effectively	  tests	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  an	  explicatum.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  topics:	  	  the	  conjunction	  fallacy	  and	  judgment	  aggregation.	  Since	  Tversky	  and	  Kahneman	  (1983)	  first	  presented	  their	  seminal	  research	  on	  the	  topic,	  psychologists	  have	  puzzled	  over	  the	  fact	  that,	  placed	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  a	  majority	  of	  people	  make	  the	  probabilistically	  erroneous	  judgment	  that	  a	  conjunction	  is	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more	  likely	  than	  one	  of	  its	  conjuncts.	  	  In	  the	  most	  famous	  example	  of	  this	  putative	  
conjunction	  fallacy,	  subjects	  are	  given	  the	  following	  information:	  	  “Linda	  is	  31	  years	  old,	  single,	  outspoken	  and	  very	  bright.	  She	  majored	  in	  philosophy.	  	  As	  a	  student,	  she	  was	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  issues	  of	  discrimination	  and	  social	  justice,	  and	  also	  participated	  in	  anti-­‐nuclear	  demonstrations.”	  	  When	  faced	  with	  this	  information,	  a	  majority	  of	  participants	  (85%	  in	  the	  original	  study)	  judge	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  “Linda	  is	  a	  bank	  teller	  and	  is	  active	  in	  the	  feminist	  movement”	  than	  that	  “Linda	  is	  a	  bank-­‐teller”	  (Tversky	  and	  Kahneman	  1983).	  A	  number	  of	  thinkers	  recently	  use	  the	  formal	  epistemological	  tools	  of	  confirmation	  theory	  to	  develop	  a	  precise	  account	  of	  these	  problematic	  judgments	  (e.g.,	  Sides	  et	  al.	  2002,	  Levi	  2004,	  and	  Crupi,	  Fitelson,	  and	  Tentori	  2008).	  	  Informally,	  the	  idea	  is	  simple:	  	  when	  people	  judge	  that	  a	  conjunction	  is	  more	  likely	  than	  is	  one	  of	  its	  conjuncts,	  their	  fallacious	  judgments	  accurately	  track	  confirmation	  relations.	  	  The	  information	  subjects	  are	  given	  about	  Linda,	  for	  example,	  plausibly	  confirms	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  she	  is	  a	  feminist	  bank-­‐teller	  far	  more	  so	  than	  it	  does	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  that	  she	  is	  a	  bank-­‐teller.	  Crupi,	  Fitelson,	  and	  Tentori	  (2008)	  put	  forward	  a	  detailed	  account	  along	  these	  lines.	  	  Where	  the	  fallacious	  judgment	  takes	  the	  form	  Pr(H1&H2|E)>Pr(H1|E),	  they	  point	  out	  that	  cases	  in	  which	  participants	  are	  susceptible	  to	  the	  fallacy	  share	  a	  set	  of	  formal	  traits	  (letting	  c	  stand	  for	  any	  of	  the	  measures	  in	  Table	  1):	  (i) E	  is	  negatively	  (if	  at	  all)	  correlated	  with	  H1:	  	  c(H1,E)≤0;	  	  (ii) E	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  H2,	  conditional	  on	  H1:	  	  c(H2,E|H1)>0;	  (iii) H1	  and	  H2	  are	  mildly	  (if	  at	  all)	  negatively	  correlated.	  	  As	  Crupi,	  Fitelson,	  and	  Tentori	  prove,	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  imply	  that	  the	  conjunction	  H1&H2	  is	  better	  confirmed	  by	  E	  than	  H1	  alone:	  	  c(H1&H2,E)>c(H1,E).	  	  Inspired	  by	  this	  result,	  they	  hypothesize	  that	  “on	  conditions	  (i)-­‐(iii),	  most	  participants	  may	  depart	  from	  the	  relevant	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probabilistic	  relationship	  between	  Pr(H1&H2|E)	  and	  Pr(H1|E)	  because	  of	  the	  perception	  that	  c(H1&H2,E)>c(H1,E).”	  Because	  this	  account	  uses	  the	  formal	  epistemological	  explication	  of	  confirmation,	  it	  has	  the	  great	  advantage	  of	  being	  unambiguous	  and	  testable;	  it	  is	  “sufficiently	  well	  defined	  to	  allow	  for	  critical	  examination”	  (Tentori,	  Crupi,	  and	  Russo	  2013,	  247).	  	  Schupbach	  (2012)	  performs	  and	  presents	  an	  initial	  experimental	  study	  of	  this	  account,	  which	  aims	  to	  establish	  the	  critical	  point	  that	  people	  are	  sometimes	  not	  susceptible	  to	  the	  fallacy	  in	  cases	  that	  satisfy	  (i)-­‐(iii).	  	  However,	  in	  their	  response,	  Tentori	  and	  Crupi	  (2012)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  inequality	  c(H1&H2,E)>c(H1,E)	  is	  plausibly	  quite	  weak	  in	  Schupbach’s	  experiments.	  	  This	  leads	  them	  to	  extend	  his	  study	  by	  varying	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  confirmation	  inequality	  across	  similar	  cases.	  	  Their	  results	  show	  that	  the	  percentage	  of	  participants	  who	  commit	  the	  fallacy	  varies	  (from	  0%	  to	  nearly	  100%)	  predictably	  with	  the	  confirmation	  relation,	  strongly	  supporting	  their	  original	  account.	  In	  another	  recent	  study,	  Tentori,	  Crupi,	  and	  Russo	  (2013)	  compare	  their	  approach	  with	  other	  accounts	  of	  the	  fallacy.	  	  They	  note	  that	  these	  other	  accounts	  make	  a	  common	  prediction:	  	  that	  as	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  added	  conjunct	  increases,	  so	  too	  does	  people’s	  susceptibility	  to	  the	  fallacy.	  	  On	  their	  confirmation-­‐theoretic	  account,	  this	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case.	  	  The	  results	  of	  four	  different	  experiments	  vindicate	  their	  account	  over	  competitors,	  concurring	  that	  “the	  conjunction	  fallacy	  predominantly	  depends	  on	  the	  perceived	  confirmation	  of	  the	  added	  conjunct	  rather	  than	  its	  perceived	  probability.”	  Bayesian	  confirmation	  theory	  has	  also	  usefully	  been	  applied	  in	  recent	  accounts	  of	  the	  experimentally	  robust	  results	  of	  Wason’s	  selection	  task	  –	  see	  (Oaksford	  and	  Chater	  2007,	  ch.	  6)	  for	  a	  review.	  	  For	  example,	  Nickerson	  (1996)	  suggests	  that	  people’s	  seemingly	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irrational	  preferences	  in	  these	  tasks	  may	  be	  shown	  to	  “have	  a	  robust	  rational	  basis”	  insofar	  as	  they	  track	  a	  confirmation-­‐theoretic	  notion	  of	  “expected	  impact”	  of	  evidence	  (the	  expected,	  absolute	  value	  of	  Cd	  –	  Table	  1).	  	  Oaksford	  and	  Chater	  (1994,	  2007)	  offer	  a	  similar	  account	  using	  a	  related	  notion	  of	  expected	  decrease	  in	  uncertainty	  (measured	  using	  Shannon	  information).	  	  The	  implications	  and	  value	  of	  such	  accounts	  remain	  open	  to	  debate,	  however	  –	  see	  Fitelson	  and	  Hawthorne’s	  (2010)	  critical	  discussion.	  These	  examples	  show	  that	  the	  tools	  of	  formal	  epistemology	  can	  help	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  perplexing	  psychological	  issues.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  Bayesian	  confirmation	  theory	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  statement	  of	  new	  accounts	  of	  the	  phenomena.	  	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  accounts	  are	  formally	  explicated	  guides	  us	  in	  experimentally	  testing	  their	  precise	  implications	  and	  predictions.	  In	  social	  epistemology,	  philosophers	  study	  epistemic	  topics	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  groups	  as	  opposed	  to	  individuals.	  	  For	  example,	  social	  epistemologists	  analyze	  what	  it	  means	  when	  we	  predicate	  knowledge,	  rationality,	  and	  the	  like	  to	  groups	  of	  people.	  	  Formal	  work	  in	  social	  epistemology	  has	  focused	  on	  developing	  and	  refining	  concepts	  and	  methods,	  which	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  illuminate	  pretheoretical	  notions	  so	  much	  as	  to	  improve	  group	  performances.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  formal	  social	  epistemology	  typically	  aims	  to	  engineer	  precise	  concepts,	  designed	  to	  improve	  group	  judgments	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  A	  prime	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  work	  on	  judgment	  aggregation.	  	  To	  construct	  a	  collective,	  group	  judgment	  out	  of	  the	  judgments	  of	  group	  members,	  some	  method	  of	  aggregation	  is	  needed.	  	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  aggregation	  methods	  available	  (averaging,	  deliberation	  procedures,	  voting	  methods,	  etc.),	  and	  each	  is	  potentially	  good	  for	  different	  purposes	  in	  different	  contexts	  –	  see	  (List	  2012)	  and	  (Lyon	  and	  Pacuit	  2014)	  for	  overviews.	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In	  a	  recent	  study,	  Lyon,	  Fidler,	  and	  Burgman	  (2012)	  run	  an	  experiment	  to	  compare	  methods	  for	  aggregating	  individual	  interval	  judgments	  –	  e.g.,	  the	  judgment	  that	  Salt	  Lake	  City’s	  average	  elevation	  is	  between	  3,500	  and	  5,000	  feet.	  	  Participants	  shared	  interval	  judgments	  in	  response	  to	  questions,	  along	  with	  corresponding	  confidence	  estimates	  (how	  likely	  they	  thought	  it	  was	  that	  the	  true	  value	  would	  be	  found	  in	  their	  given	  interval).	  	  Each	  subject	  was	  then	  asked	  for	  confidence	  estimates	  again,	  but	  this	  time	  regarding	  the	  interval	  judgments	  of	  another	  participant	  (the	  goal	  here	  was	  to	  reduce	  an	  overconfidence	  effect).	  	  Interval	  judgments	  were	  then	  aggregated	  using	  the	  following	  methods:	  
• Maximum	  Confidence	  Slating:	  choose	  the	  judgment	  with	  the	  highest	  associated	  confidence	  level.	  	  MJCS	  uses	  confidence	  levels	  assigned	  by	  the	  judge;	  MECS	  uses	  those	  assigned	  by	  the	  separate	  evaluator.	  
• Maximum	  Information	  Slating:	  choose	  the	  judgment	  with	  the	  highest	  associated	  value	  of	  confidence	  level	  divided	  by	  interval	  width.	  	  MJIS	  uses	  confidence	  levels	  assigned	  by	  the	  judge;	  MEIS	  uses	  those	  assigned	  by	  the	  separate	  evaluator.	  
• Maximum	  Consensus	  Slating	  (MConS):	  choose	  the	  interval	  on	  which	  the	  two	  confidence	  estimates	  (the	  judge’s	  and	  evaluator’s)	  most	  closely	  agree.	  This	  study	  produced	  several	  interesting	  results.	  	  First,	  when	  confidence	  estimates	  are	  given	  for	  others’	  judgments	  instead	  of	  one’s	  own,	  overconfidence	  is	  greatly	  reduced;	  while	  both	  the	  confidence	  estimates	  of	  judges	  and	  evaluators	  displayed	  overconfidence,	  this	  was	  reduced	  60.5%	  in	  the	  latter	  case.	  	  This	  important	  finding	  gives	  us	  a	  potential	  solution	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  overconfidence	  of	  individuals	  is	  pernicious	  to	  group	  performance.	  	  The	  study	  also	  reveals	  that	  the	  various	  aggregation	  methods	  “have	  different	  strengths,”	  with	  different	  methods	  coming	  out	  on	  top	  on	  different	  dimensions	  (hit	  rate,	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accuracy,	  calibration).	  	  For	  example,	  MECS	  has	  the	  highest	  hit	  rate	  of	  any	  considered	  method	  –	  meaning	  that	  the	  intervals	  it	  picks	  out	  contain	  the	  true	  value	  in	  a	  greater	  percentage	  of	  cases	  than	  do	  those	  picked	  out	  by	  other	  means	  –	  while	  MConS	  displayed	  consistently	  low	  overconfidence	  levels.	  This	  experiment	  not	  only	  verifies	  that	  different	  aggregation	  methods	  are	  good	  for	  different	  purposes,	  but	  it	  also	  gives	  specific	  guidance	  regarding	  which	  methods	  do	  certain	  tasks	  well.	  	  Such	  information	  is	  vital	  when	  our	  philosophical	  goal	  is	  to	  engineer	  concepts	  and	  methods	  that	  lead	  us	  more	  efficiently	  to	  epistemically	  desirable	  ends.	  	  Similar	  studies	  explore	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  other	  aggregation	  methods	  in	  other	  contexts.	  	  For	  example,	  these	  same	  researchers	  (with	  additional	  collaborators;	  Wintle	  et	  al.	  2013)	  present	  the	  early	  results	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  study	  observing	  the	  forecasting	  performance	  of	  group	  predictions,	  aggregated	  using	  structured	  (Delphi-­‐style)	  deliberation	  in	  groups	  of	  diverse	  individuals.	  	  3. Other	  Topics	  and	  Further	  Reading	  This	  chapter	  has	  surveyed	  work	  in	  which	  formal	  and	  experimental	  methods	  provide	  mutually	  informative	  means	  to	  epistemological	  ends.	  	  Experiments	  have	  been	  used	  to	  test	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  formal	  epistemological	  explications	  satisfy	  important	  desiderata,	  similarity	  and	  fruitfulness.	  	  And	  such	  explicative	  research	  has,	  in	  turn,	  advanced	  epistemically-­‐relevant	  experimental	  work,	  allowing	  for	  exact	  and	  precisely	  testable	  new	  theories	  of	  puzzling	  phenomena.	  	  The	  above	  survey	  is	  both	  simplified	  and	  incomplete.	  	  Interested	  readers	  should	  follow	  relevant	  citations	  to	  dig	  more	  deeply	  into	  any	  discussed	  topic.	  	  Other	  subjects	  this	  chapter	  might	  just	  as	  well	  have	  covered	  include	  work	  on	  causal	  reasoning	  and	  modeling	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(Danks,	  this	  volume;	  Sloman	  and	  Park,	  this	  volume),	  reasoning	  with	  conditionals	  beyond	  the	  Wason	  task	  (Douven,	  this	  volume),	  the	  learning	  and	  emergence	  of	  conventions	  (Devetag,	  Hosni,	  and	  Sillari	  2013;	  Bruner	  et	  al.	  Forthcoming),	  and	  general	  issues	  related	  to	  logic	  (Ripley,	  this	  volume).	  	  Another	  field	  of	  research	  I	  have	  sidestepped	  (as	  any	  useful	  discussion	  of	  it	  would	  take	  up	  an	  entire	  chapter	  of	  itself)	  uses	  experiments	  to	  compare	  inductive	  logics	  with	  “everyday	  rationality.”	  	  The	  reader	  might	  refer	  to	  (Chater	  et	  al.	  2009)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  this	  literature,	  to	  (Oaksford	  and	  Chater	  2007)	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  predominant	  Bayesian	  paradigm,	  and	  to	  (Unterhuber	  and	  Schurz	  2013)	  for	  one	  recent	  experimental	  criticism	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  approach.	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